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Abstract
This paper introduces a new model concerning cooperative situations in which the payoffs are
modeled by random variables. First, we study adequate preference relations of the agents. Next,
we define corresponding cooperative games and we introduce and study various basic notions like
an allocation, the core and marginal vectors. Furthermore, we introduce three types of convexity,
namely coalitional-merge, individual-merge and marginal convexity. The relations between these
definitions are studied and in particular, as opposed to the deterministic counterparts for TU
games, we show that these three types of convexity are not equivalent. However, all types imply
that the core of the game is nonempty and the first two types even imply that each subgame has
a nonempty core. In particular, we show that the Shapley value, the average of the marginal
vectors, belongs to the core of the convex game for certain types of preferences and for any type
of convexity.
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1 Introduction
In many real-life situations payoffs to agents are uncertain. For example, consider two musicians, a
pianist and a violinist. Each of them has a contract with a hotel to give small performances. Their
payoffs consist of a small wage and the tips they receive during their performances. At the end of
the month their contracts will end and both their employers offer them a new contract with the same
conditions. Until now these musicians always performed separately, although recently they started
studying some pieces for violin and piano together. This is because they found a (third) hotel that is
willing to contract both of them. This contract says that bothmusicians only perform for this hotel and
their individual payoffs consist of a small wage. Ten percent of all the tips they receive during their
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performances will be for the hotel and the remaining 90 percent will be divided among the pianist and
the violinist. Before the end of the month the musicians have to decide whether to cooperate or not.
In both cases their payoffs will be uncertain because they depend on the uncertain amount of tips to
be received during performances.
Another situationwith uncertain payoffs is the following. Consider a firm that goes bankrupt. An
intermediary is appointed who will settle the remaining financial matters of the firm. All creditors
claim their money while the intermediary finds out that the only money left in the firm is a portfolio
consisting of shares and options. When the creditors agree upon a distribution of this portfolio among
themselves, then this distribution will be executed. Each of them receives a small portfolio with an
uncertain value because the prices at the shares and options markets change over time. This kind of
situations are called bankruptcy situations and we will return to it later in this paper.
In ’classical’ cooperative game theory, payoffs to coalitions of agents are known with certainty.
Therefore, situations with uncertain payoffs in which the agents cannot await the realizations of these
payoffs, cannot be modeled according to this theory. CHARNES and GRANOT (1973) and SUIJS, BORM,
DE WAEGENAERE and TIJS (1999) introduced new models that can handle uncertain payoffs.
CHARNES and GRANOT (1973) introduced games in stochastic characteristic function form. These
are games where the payoff to coalition S, V (S), is allowed to be a random variable. To allocate
the payoff of the grand coalition to the players, the authors suggest a two-stage procedure. In the
first stage, so called prior-payoffs are promised to the agents. These prior-payoffs are determined
such that there is a relatively high chance that the promises can be realized. In the second stage the
realizations of the payoffs are awaited and, if necessary, the prior-payoff vector has to be adjusted to
this realization. Research on this subject was continued in CHARNES and GRANOT (1976, 1977) and
GRANOT (1977).
In SUIJS and BORM (1999) a different and more extensive model is studied. They consider a set
AS of actions that coalition S can take. The stochastic value of this coalition then depends on which
action a ∈ AS is chosen and is denoted by XS(a). This, however, is not the main feature we like
to stress. It is the fact that an allocation of XS(a) to the members of coalition S is described as the
sum of two parts. The first part is a monetary transfer between the agents and the second part is an
allocation of fractions of XS(a). Work on this model was started in SUIJS, BORM, DE WAEGENAERE
and TIJS (1999) and an application in insurance can be found in SUIJS, DE WAEGENAERE and BORM
(1998).
In this paper we introduce a model that, when compared to the previous two models, looks the
most like the model of SUIJS et al. but there are some major differences. First, in the model of SUIJS et
al., a collection V(S) of stochastic payoffs is assigned to each coalition S of agents. EachX ∈ V(S)
is a possible stochastic payoff to coalition S. In our model, we assign a single random value R(S)
to each coalition of agents. This value contains all the information that the coalition knows about its
payoff.
Second, allocations are defined differently. In the model of SUIJS et al. allocations are defined as
follows. Let S be a coalition of agents and let X ∈ V(S) be a stochastic payoff for this coalition.
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An allocation of X to the agents in S is represented by a pair (d, r) ∈ IRS × IRS with∑i∈S di ≤ 0,∑
i∈S ri = 1 and ri ≥ 0 for all agents i ∈ S. Given such a pair (d, r), agent i ∈ S receives the
stochastic payoff di + riX . The second part, riX , describes the fraction of X that is allocated to
agent i. The first part, di, describes the deterministic transfer payments between the agents. When
di ≥ 0 then agent i receives money while di < 0 means that this agent pays money. The purpose
of these transfer payments is that the agents compensate among themselves for transfers of random
payoffs. For example, a risk-averse agent (that is an agent who ‘hates’ uncertainty) who receives a
large fraction of X can be compensated by the other agents if they give him an adequate positive
amount di. The set of allocations that coalition S can obtain, contains all such allocations for all
X ∈ V(S).
In our model, allocations are defined as follows. Let S be a coalition of agents. An allocation
of the single random value R(S) to the agents in S is a division of this stochastic payoff where each
agent receives a multiple of R(S). Given a vector p ∈ IRS , pR(S) is an allocation (in terms) of R(S)
where agent i ∈ S receives the (possibly negative) multiple piR(S). Such an allocation is efficient if∑
i∈S pi = 1. Thus, we see that the model of SUIJS et al. only allocates fractions of stochastic payoffs
while our model allocates multiples of such payoffs. Furthermore, the model of SUIJS et al. allows
for deterministic transfer payments while our model does not allow for this. In specific applications
these payments do not always seem very realistic. If you recall the second example at the beginning
of this section about creditors claiming their money from a firm that went bankrupt, then it seems very
unlikely that the creditors will decide upon deterministic transfer payments among themselves once
the portfolio will be distributed.
First, we set up a framework that defines how each agent compares any two stochastic payoffs that
may be allocated to him. In this framework we introduce a so-called embedding map αi for agent i
that ‘embeds’ one stochastic payoff in the other as follows. For specific pairs of stochastic payoffsX
and Y where Y &= 0, αi(X, Y ) is the real number α such that agent i is indifferent between receiving
X or αY . Our assumptions on the preferences imply that this number α is uniquely determined and
so, we have for each agent a unique embedding ofX into Y .
Special attention will be paid to convexity in cooperative situations with uncertain payoffs. We
define three types of convexity for games corresponding to these situations. The three types are
coalitional-merge convex, individual-merge convex and marginal convex. The first two are based on
the marginal contributions of a coalition of agents and a single agent, respectively, while the third
type, marginal convexity, is based on whether or not all the marginal vectors belong to the core of the
game. We show that coalitional-merge convexity implies individual-merge convexity, which in turn
implies marginal convexity. Examples show that reverse relations need not hold. In particular, each
marginal convex game has a nonempty core as well as each subgame of an individual-merge convex
game. Besides, we extend the definition of the Shapley value for TU games as the average of the
marginal vectors to our class of stochastic cooperative games. We show that the Shapley value is an
element of the core of a marginal convex game for certain types of preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Allocations of random variables and the
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preference relations of the agents over these allocations are defined in section 2. After this, we give a
formal description of our model in section 3 and we extend several basic notions from deterministic
TU games, like allocations, imputations, superadditivity, the core and marginal vectors, to our model.
We end this section with an explicit example of a bankruptcy game to illustrate the new notions. In
section 4 we introduce and study the three types of convexity as discussed above. As opposed to
deterministic TU games, we show that these types are not equivalent. However, they all imply that the
core of the game is nonempty and for certain types of preferences this core contains the Shapley value.
Furthermore, while deterministic bankruptcy games are convex, an example indicates that bankruptcy
games with an uncertain estate may or may not satisfy any of the introduced convexity types.
2 Preference relations
A complete preference relation of an agent describes which one of two alternatives this agent weakly
prefers to the other, for any two alternatives. Here, the alternatives are random variables allocated to
this agent. For this, we have to define allocations of random variables before we can turn our attention
to the preference relations. But we will start with the probability space.
Let (Ω,F , IP) be a probability space, where Ω is the outcome space, F is a σ-algebra in Ω and IP
is a probability measure on F . A stochastic variable X ∈ IRF is a measurable function that assigns
to each outcome ω ∈ Ω a real number X(ω). The set of all stochastic variables X with a finite
expectation is denoted by L and L+ is the set of all nonnegative stochastic variables in L. By 0 we
denote the stochastic variable that takes the value zero for sure. Note that 0 ∈ L+.
A deterministic cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU game, is described by a pair
(N, v) where N is the set of agents and v : 2N → IR is the characteristic function assigning to each
coalition S ⊂ N a value v(S) and v(∅) = 0. If we introduce uncertainty into this model, such
that coalitions of agents may not know for sure what payoff they will receive, then the payoffs will
be random variables. Denote by R(S) the stochastic payoff (reward) in L+ to coalition S. For a
nonempty coalitionS of agents, an allocation (in terms) ofR(S) is a distributionofmultiples ofR(S).
If p ∈ IRS then pR(S) is an allocation in terms of R(S)where agent i ∈ S receives piR(S). Such an
allocation is efficient if∑i∈S pi = 1. For ease of notation define∆∗(S) = {p ∈ IRS |∑i∈S pi = 1}.
Now that we know how the payoffs of the coalitions can be distributed, it is time to see how agents
compare two stochastic payoffs. First we restrict ourselves to nonzero random payoffs and after that
we include the zero payoffs. Let A = {R(S)|S ⊂ N, S &= ∅, R(S) &= 0} be the set of all nonzero
payoffs to coalitions of agents. Rename them such that A = {R(S1), R(S2), . . . , R(Sm)} for some
integer number m. Because allocations are multiples of payoffs, the set of all possible stochastic
payoffs restricted to the random values in A equals B = {pR(Sk)| p ∈ IR, R(Sk) ∈ A}. By i we
denote the preference relation of agent i ∈ N over B. If for some stochastic payoffs X , Y it holds
that X i Y then the agent weakly prefers receiving the stochastic payoff X to receiving Y while
X *i Y means that the agent strictly prefersX to Y . IfX i Y and Y i X then we writeX ∼i Y ,
the agent is indifferent between receivingX or Y . We make the following assumption about how an
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agent compares two payoffs inB.
Assumption 2.1 For each agent i ∈ N there exists a function f i : IR → IRm, which is surjective,
continuous and monotone increasing, such that
1. f ik(t)R(Sk) i f il (t′)R(Sl) if and only if t ≥ t′,
2. f ik(0) = 0
for any k, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}.
This kind of preferences is particularly suitable for our model, which will be presented in the next
section. So, when agent i compares the payoffs pR(Sk) and qR(Sl) then pR(Sk) i qR(Sl) if and
only if t = (f ik)−1(p) ≥ t′ = (f il )−1(q). The assumptions on f i imply that these inverse functions
exist and the condition f ik(0) = 0 is a normalization condition. One may interpret the function (f ik)−1
as some kind of utility function with respect to multiples of R(S k) only.
We say that a preference relation i is reflexive if X i X is true for all X ∈ B. Secondly,
it is transitive if X i Y and Y i Z implies that X i Z for any X, Y, Z ∈ B and thirdly, it is
monotone increasing when pR(Sk) i qR(Sk) if and only if p ≥ q. The following theorem shows
that these properties hold.
Theorem 2.2 If a preference relation i satisfies assumption 2.1 then it is reflexive, transitive and
monotone increasing.
The proof is left to the reader. Another implication of assumption 2.1 is that R(Sk) *i 0 for all
R(Sk) ∈ A because 1R(Sk) = R(Sk) *i 0R(Sk) = 0 if and only if t > t′ where 1 = f ik(t) and
0 = f ik(t
′)⇔ t′ = 0. This is true because f i is monotone increasing. Similarly it follows that
pR(Sk) *i 0 ⇔ p > 0
pR(Sk) ∼i 0 ⇔ p = 0
pR(Sk) ≺i 0 ⇔ p < 0.
The following example presents two preference relations that satisfy assumption 2.1.
Example 2.3 The first type of preferences we discuss here concerns expected values of random
variables. Suppose that the preferences of agent i are such thatX i Y if and only if E(X) ≥ E(Y )
for anyX, Y ∈ B, where E(X) is the expectation ofX . We call this type of preferences expectation-
preferences. Then f ik(t) = t/E(R(Sk)) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} makes sure that i satisfies
assumption 2.1.
A second type of preferences involves quantiles of random variables. Let uXβi = sup{t ∈
IR| Pr{X ≤ t} ≤ βi} be the βi-quantile of X , where 0 < βi < 1 is such that uR(Sk)βi > 0 for all
R(Sk) ∈ A. Define the utility function Ui by Ui(X) = uXβi if E(X) ≥ 0 and Ui(X) = uX1−βi
otherwise. Suppose thatX i Y if and only if Ui(X) ≥ Ui(Y ) for any X, Y ∈ B. We call this type
of preferences quantile-preferences. The functions f ik(t) = t/uR(Sk)βi for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} will
do the job.
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Note that for both expectation- and quantile-preferences all the functions f ik are linear, that is,
f ik(t) = f
i
k(1)t for all i ∈ N , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. We will return to this type of preference relations later
in this section.
An important consequence of assumption 2.1 is given in the next theorem, where B−0 =
{pR(Sk) ∈ B| p &= 0}.
Theorem 2.4 For all X ∈ B, Y ∈ B−0 and i ∈ N there exists a unique number α ∈ IR such that
X ∼i αY .
Proof. Let X ∈ B, Y ∈ B−0 and i ∈ N , then X = pR(Sk) for some p ∈ IR, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}
and Y = qR(Sl) for some q &= 0, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. By assumption 2.1 there exists a number t ∈ IR
such that f ik(t) = p. By definition of f i it holds that f il (t)R(Sl) ∼i f ik(t)R(Sk) = X . We know that
t = (f ik)
−1(p) and this gives
X ∼i f
i
l ((f
i
k)
−1(p))R(Sl) = f
i
l ((f
i
k)
−1(p))/q · qR(Sl)
= f il ((f
i
k)
−1(p))/q · Y.
We conclude that α = f il ((f ik)−1(p))/q. The function f i is monotone increasing and this implies that
this number α is unique.
To be able to keep track of which α is connected to which variablesX , Y , and i we define for all
agents i ∈ N the embedding function αi : B ×B−0 → IR by αi(X, Y ) = f il ((f ik)−1(p))/q, and so,
X ∼i αi(X, Y )Y , where X = pR(Sk) and Y = qR(Sl), q &= 0. Thus, the embedding function αi
gives a complete description of the preference relation of agent i.
What happens if R(S) = 0 for some coalition S of agents? For allX ∈ B−0 it holds that either
X *i 0 or X ≺i 0. Because αR(S) = 0 for any α ∈ IR it follows that for all i ∈ N there exists no
α ∈ IR such thatX ∼i αR(S). The only thingwe will define in this kind of situation is α i(0, 0) = 1.
The following example shows what the embedding functions look like for the preferences in the
previous example.
Example 2.5 Consider the preference relations in the previous example and take X ∈ B, X =
pR(Sk), and Y ∈ B−0, Y = qR(Sl). For the expectation-preferences it holds that
αi(X, Y ) = f
i
l ((f
i
k)
−1(p))/q = pE(R(Sk))/(qE(R(Sl))) = E(X)/E(Y )
and for the quantile-preferences it follows that
αi(X, Y ) = pu
R(Sk)
βi
/(quR(Sl)βi )
where 0 < βi < 1 is such that uR(Sl)βi > 0 for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}.
The next theorem states some nice properties of the function αi.
Theorem 2.6 For all i ∈ N
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1. αi(hZ, Z) = h for any h ∈ IR, Z ∈ B−0,
2. αi(αi(X, Y )Y, Z) = αi(X,Z) for anyX ∈ B and Y, Z ∈ B−0,
3. αi(pR(Sk), qR(Sl)) = pαi(R(Sk), R(Sl))/q for any pR(Sk) ∈ B and qR(Sl) ∈ B−0 if the
functions f ik , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, are linear.
Proof. For the first item, let h ∈ IR andZ ∈ B−0, then hZ ∼i αi(hZ, Z)Z by definition of αi. From
theorem 2.2 we know that i is monotone increasing and this implies that h = α i(hZ, Z).
To prove the second item, letX ∈ B and Y, Z ∈ B−0. ThenX ∼i αi(X, Y )Y andαi(X, Y )Y ∼i
αi(αi(X, Y )Y, Z)Z by definition of αi. According to theorem 2.2, i is transitive, and so, X ∼i
αi(αi(X, Y )Y, Z)Z. Hence, αi(αi(X, Y )Y, Z) = αi(X,Z) because i is alsomonotone increasing.
Finally, let pR(Sk) ∈ B and qR(Sl) ∈ B−0. If the functions f ik are linear then
αi(pR(Sk), qR(Sl)) = f
i
l ((f
i
k)
−1(p))/q = pf il ((f
i
k)
−1(1))/q
= pαi(R(Sk), R(Sl))/q,
which concludes the proof.
3 The model
In this section we will describe our model in more detail. We define the corresponding games where
coalitionsof players receive random values. After thiswe extend some basic definitions in cooperative
game theory to our model and illustrate these concepts with an example of a bankruptcy game.
Given a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, variables R(S) ∈ L+ and preference relations i for all
i ∈ N , a game (N,R,α) is a cooperative game whereN denotes the set of players, the mapR assigns
to each nonempty coalition in N a random value in L+, and α = (αi)i∈N with αi the previously
defined function that describes what multiple of one stochastic variable player i finds equivalent to
another stochastic variable.
We will now extend various notions from deterministic TU games to cooperative games with
stochastic payoffs. Recall from the previous section that if p ∈ IRS then pR(S) is an allocation (in
terms) of R(S) and such an allocation is efficient if p ∈ ∆∗(S) = {p ∈ IRS|∑i∈S pi = 1}. An
allocation pR(S) for coalition S is individual rational if p iR(S) i R({i}) for all i ∈ S. We will
denote the set of all efficient individual rational allocations of R(S) for coalition S by IR(S).
An allocation of R(N) is called an imputation if it is individual rational and efficient. The
imputation set I(N,R,α) is the set of all imputations.
I(N,R,α) = {{piR(N)}i∈N |p ∈ ∆
∗(N); piR(N) i R({i}) for all i ∈ N }
Note that I(N,R,α) = IR(N). Depending upon the random values of the various coalitions we can
say something more about the structure of the imputation set.
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Lemma 3.1 I(N,R,α) ⊂ {pR(N)| p ∈ ∆∗(N), pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N} if R(N) &= 0. If R(N) = 0
and R({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N then I(N,R,α) = {pR(N)| p ∈ ∆∗(N)}. If R(N) = 0 and
R({i}) &= 0 for some i ∈ N then I(N,R,α) = ∅.
Proof. Let R(N) &= 0. If I(N,R,α) = ∅ then we are done. Otherwise take an imputation pR(N).
Then piR(N) i R({i}), which is equivalent to pi ≥ αi(R({i}), R(N)) ≥ 0 where the first
inequality follows from monotonicity of the preferences and the second one from R(N) &= 0 and
R({i}) ∈ L+. The two remaining statements are trivial.
The game (N,R,α) is superadditive if for all S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅, S &= ∅ and T &= ∅, for
all pR(S) ∈ IR(S) and for all qR(T ) ∈ IR(T ) there exists an allocation rR(S∪T ), r ∈ ∆∗(S∪T ),
such that all players are weakly better off: riR(S ∪ T ) i piR(S) for all i ∈ S,riR(S ∪ T ) i qiR(T ) for all i ∈ T.
Notice that rR(S ∪T ) ∈ IR(S ∪ T ). We also could have formulated superadditivity in the following
way: for all T1, T2, . . . , Tk ⊂ N , k ≥ 2, such that Ti &= ∅ and Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for all i &= j, and for all
piR(Ti) ∈ IR(Ti), i = 1, 2, . . . , k there exists an allocation rR(∪ki=1Ti), r ∈ ∆∗(∪ki=1Ti), such that
rjR(∪
k
i=1Ti) i p
i
jR(Ti) for all j ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , k, (1)
all players are weakly better off. Obviously, this alternative definition implies superadditivity. The
other way around is also true, as is shown hereafter.
Lemma 3.2 If a game (N,R,α) is superadditive then it satisfies the alternative definition (1).
Proof. Assume that the game (N,R,α) is superadditive. Then condition (1) is satisfied for k = 2.
We will use induction on the number k of coalitions to show that this game satisfies condition (1).
So, suppose that (1) is satisfied for k coalitions, 2 ≤ k < n with n the total number of players. Take
coalitionsT1, T2, . . . , Tk+1 ⊂ N such thatTi &= ∅ and Ti∩Tj = ∅ for i &= j and let piR(Ti) ∈ IR(Ti)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1. By induction there exists an allocation rR(∪ki=1Ti), r ∈ ∆∗(∪ki=1Ti), such
that
rjR(∪
k
i=1Ti) j p
i
jR(Ti) for all j ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. (2)
Note that piR(Ti) ∈ IR(Ti) implies that rR(∪ki=1Ti) ∈ IR(∪ki=1Ti). It follows from superadditivity
and pk+1R(Tk+1) ∈ IR(Tk+1) that there exists an allocation sR(∪k+1i=1 Ti), s ∈ ∆∗(∪k+1i=1 Ti) such that sjR(∪k+1i=1 Ti) j rjR(∪ki=1Ti) for all j ∈ ∪ki=1TisjR(∪k+1i=1 Ti) j pk+1j R(Tk+1) for all j ∈ Tk+1.
Transitivity of the preference relations and (2) imply that
sjR(∪
k+1
i=1 Ti) j p
i
jR(Ti) for all j ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , k+ 1.
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Hence, (1) is satisfied for k + 1 coalitions.
This result implies the following relation between superadditive games and the sets IR(S) of
individual rational allocations.
Lemma 3.3 If a game (N,R,α) is superadditive then IR(S) &= ∅ for all nonempty coalitions S.
Proof. Let the game (N,R,α) be superadditive and take a coalition S ⊂ N , S &= ∅. According to
lemma 3.2 the alternative definition (1) is satisfied. Let s be the number of players in S and define
Ti = {i} for i = 1, . . . , s. Then IR(Ti) = IR({i}) = {R({i})} and ∪si=1Ti = S. By (1) there exists
an allocation rR(S), r ∈ ∆∗(S), such that riR(S) i R({i}) for all i ∈ S. Thus rR(S) ∈ IR(S).
For all S ⊂ N , S &= ∅, the set dom(S) contains the allocations of R(N) restricted to coalition S
that are dominated by this coalition, i.e., there exists an allocation qR(S), q ∈ ∆∗(S), that is strictly
preferred by all members of S.
dom(S) =
{
pR(N)
∣∣∣ p ∈ IRS, ∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : qiR(S) *i piR(N) for all i ∈ S}
The set of allocations that are not dominated by some coalition can take many forms, depending upon
the random values. Let D be a set of allocations of R(N) that satisfy some restrictions. We say
that D is a convex set of allocations if and only if the set {p| pR(N) ∈ D} is a convex set in IRN .
Furthermore let pS = {pi}i∈S be the restriction of p ∈ IRN to coalition S.
Lemma 3.4 Let S ⊂ N be a nonempty set of players. Then
pSR(N) /∈ dom(S)⇔
 p ∈ IRN if R(S) = 0 and R(N) = 0,pi ≥ 0 for some i ∈ S if R(S) = 0 and R(N) &= 0.
If R(S) &= 0 and R(N) = 0 then pSR(N) ∈ dom(S) for all p ∈ IRN . Furthermore, if all the
functions f ik are linear, R(S) &= 0 and R(N) &= 0 then the set {pR(N)| pSR(N) /∈ dom(S)} is
convex.
Proof. We only prove the last statement. The remaining parts of the lemma are trivial.
Let (N,R,α) be a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs and let S ⊂ N be a nonempty set of
players. Assume that R(S) &= 0 and R(N) &= 0. Then pSR(N) /∈ dom(S) if and only if there exists
no vector q ∈ ∆∗(S) such that qiR(S) *i piR(N) for all i ∈ S. By monotonicity of the preferences
we have
& ∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : αi(qiR(S), R(N))> pi for all i ∈ S.
By property 3 in theorem 2.6 this is equivalent to
& ∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : qiαi(R(S), R(N))> pi for all i ∈ S,
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so,
& ∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : qi > pi/αi(R(S), R(N)) for all i ∈ S.
Hence,∑
i∈S
pi/αi(R(S), R(N))≥ 1.
Define h ∈ IRS by hi = 1/αi(R(S), R(N)). Then hi > 0 for all i ∈ S and pSR(N) /∈ dom(S) if
and only if∑i∈S hipi ≥ 1. We conclude that the set {pR(N)| pSR(N) /∈ dom(S)} is convex.
The core of (N,R,α), denoted by C(N,R,α), consists of all payoff vectors attainable for the
grand coalition that are not dominated by any coalition S, that is
C(N,R,α) = {pR(N) |p ∈ ∆∗(N), pSR(N) /∈ dom(S) for all S ⊂ N, S &= ∅} .
Because
piR(N) /∈ dom({i})⇔ piR(N) i R({i})
holds for all i ∈ N , the core is a subset of the imputation set, C(N,R,α) ⊂ I(N,R,α), for all
games (N,R,α). In particular, C(N,R,α) = I(N,R,α) for 2-person games. Using the results in
the theorems 3.1 and 3.4 we can show that the core is convex if the functions f ik of every agent are
linear.
Theorem 3.5 Let (N,R,α) be a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs where all the functions f ik
are linear. Then the core C(N,R,α) is a convex set.
Proof. Let undom(S) = {pR(N)| p ∈ ∆∗(N), pSR(N) /∈ dom(S)} be the set of efficient alloca-
tions of R(N) that are not dominated by coalition S. Then
I(N,R,α) = ∩i∈N undom({i})
and this implies that
C(N,R,α) = ∩S⊂N, S &=∅ undom(S) = I(N,R,α)∩
(
∩S⊂N, |S|≥2 undom(S)
)
.
Firstly, suppose that R(N) = 0. If R(S) &= 0 for some S ⊂ N then undom(S) = ∅ according to
theorem 3.4 and by this C(N,R,α) = ∅. If R(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N then according to the same
theorem undom(S) = ∆∗(N) for all S ⊂ N and so C(N,R,α) = ∆∗(N), which is a convex set.
Secondly, if R(N) &= 0 then undom({i}) = {pR(N)| p ∈ ∆∗(N), piR(N) i R({i})} =
{pR(N)| p ∈ ∆∗(N), pi ≥ αi(R({i}), R(N))} is a convex set for all i ∈ N and so is I(N,R,α).
If R(S) = 0 for some S ⊂ N then undom(S) = {pR(N)| p ∈ ∆∗(N), pi ≥ 0 for some i ∈ S}
according to theorem 3.4 and by theorem 3.1 it follows that undom(S) ⊃ I(N,R,α). This implies
that undom(S) ∩ I(N,R,α) = I(N,R,α), which is a convex set. If R(S) &= 0 then it follows from
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theorem 3.4 that undom(S) is a convex set. We conclude that also in case R(N) &= 0 it holds that
C(N,R,α) is a convex set.
A permutation σ of the players in N is a function from {1, 2, . . . , n} to N and σ(i) denotes
which player in N is at position i. Let Π(N) be the set of all permutations of N . Denote by
Sσi = {σ(k)| k ≤ i} the set of the first i players according to permutation σ, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and
let Sσ0 = ∅. In a deterministic TU game (N, v) the marginal vectormσ(v) is defined by
mσσ(k)(v) = v(S
σ
k )− v(S
σ
k−1)(= v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k)})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k− 1)}))
for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
In cooperative games with stochastic payoffs marginal vectors can be defined in a similar way.
For this we need the following assumption on cooperative games with stochastic payoffs.
Assumption 3.6 If R(T ) = 0 for some coalition T ⊂ N then R(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ T , S &= ∅.
The first player according to σ, i.e., σ(1), receives Y σσ(1) = R({σ(1)}). If the second player, σ(2),
joins then the two players together can get R(S σ2 ). By assumption 3.6 ασ(1)(Y σσ(1), R(Sσ2 )) exists
and because Y σσ(1) ∼σ(1) ασ(1)(Y σσ(1), R(Sσ2 ))R(Sσ2 ) the marginal contribution Rσσ(2) of player σ(2)
to coalition Sσ1 is
Y σσ(2) = R(S
σ
2 )− ασ(1)(Y
σ
σ(1), R(S
σ
2 ))R(S
σ
2 )
=
[
1− ασ(1)(Y
σ
σ(1), R(S
σ
2 ))
]
R(Sσ2 ).
Similarly, the marginal contribution of the third player is
Y σσ(3) = R(S
σ
3 )− ασ(1)(Y
σ
σ(1), R(S
σ
3 ))R(S
σ
3 )− ασ(2)(Y
σ
σ(2), R(S
σ
3 ))R(S
σ
3 )
=
[
1−
2∑
k=1
ασ(k)(Y
σ
σ(k), R(S
σ
3 ))
]
R(Sσ3 )
and the marginal contribution of the ith player, σ(i), to coalition Sσi−1 is
Y σσ(i) =
[
1−
i−1∑
k=1
ασ(k)(Y
σ
σ(k), R(S
σ
i ))
]
R(Sσi )
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then the marginal vectorMσ is defined by
Mσσ(i) = ασ(i)(Y
σ
σ(i), R(N))R(N)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and so, this marginal vector is an efficient allocation of R(N). Based on these
marginal vectors we define the Shapley value φ as the average of the n! marginal vectors,
φ =
1
n!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
Mσ
just like its counterpart for deterministic TU-games (cf. SHAPLEY (1953)).
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To conclude this section, we give an example of a bankruptcy game that illustrates the concepts
introduced in this section. In deterministic bankruptcy situations, an estate e ≥ 0 has to be divided
among the agents inN . Agent i ∈ N claims the amount di ≥ 0 and the total amount claimed exceeds
the estate,∑i∈N di ≥ e. The value of a coalition S ⊂ N in the corresponding game is given by (cf.
O’NEILL (1982))
v(S) = max
e − ∑
i∈N\S
di, 0
 .
Situations where the estate e is not known with certainty may also occur. One can think for example
of the following. A widower just passed away and since none of his children wants to have any
of his properties they will all be sold at some future point in time. However, at present each child
claims a deterministic part of the total stochastic revenue. Our model offers a way to ‘translate’ these
deterministic claims in a justifiable way into multiples of the total amount of properties (and hence
into multiples of the eventual realized revenue) without having to await the specific outcome of the
property sale.
To model these situations as a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs, denote the uncertain
estate byE ∈ L+ and the deterministic claim of agent i by di. These claims are such that they always
exceed the estate, that is, the event E ≤ ∑i∈N di takes place with probability 1. Let N be the set of
claimants. Then
R(S) = max
E − ∑
i∈N\S
di, 0

is the payoff to the coalition S ⊂ N of claimants.
Example 3.7 Consider the following bankruptcy situation. There are three agents, N = {1, 2, 3},
and their claims on the estate are d1 = 200, d2 = 180, d3 = 100. The estateE equals
E =

200 w.p. 1/4,
300 w.p. 1/2,
400 w.p. 1/4,
where w.p. means ’with probability’. From R(S) = max{E −∑i∈N\S di, 0} it follows that the
values of the various coalitions are
R({1}) = max{E − 280, 0} =

0 w.p. 1/4
20 w.p. 1/2
120 w.p. 1/4
R({2}) = max{E − 300, 0} =
 0 w.p. 3/4100 w.p. 1/4
and so on. We notice that R(N) = max{E, 0} = E. The preference relations of the players are
as follows. Player 1 has expectation-preferences and the players 2 and 3 have quantile-preferences
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with β2 = 0.75 and β3 = 0.9. Thus for player 1 it holds that for all X, Y ∈ B X 1 Y if and
only if E(X) ≥ E(Y ). In section 2 we showed that α1(X, Y ) = E(X)/E(Y ) for all X ∈ B,
Y ∈ B−0. For players 2 and 3 and for all X, Y ∈ B it holds that X i Y if and only if
Ui(X) ≥ Ui(Y ) with Ui(X) = uXβi if E(X) ≥ 0 and Ui(X) = uX1−βi otherwise, for i = 2, 3. Then
αi(X, Y ) = pu
R(Sk)
βi
/(quR(Sl)βi ) for all X ∈ B, Y ∈ B−0 such that X = pR(Sk) and Y = qR(Sl).
Because βi ≥ 0.75 for i = 2, 3 it holds that uR(S)βi > 0 for all S ⊂ N , S &= ∅.
All individual rational allocations are in the set
I(N,R,α) = {pR(N) |p ∈ ∆∗(N), p1 ≥ 2/15, p2 ≥ 1/4, p3 ≥ 1/20}
and the core equals
C(N,R,α) =
pR(N) ∈ I(N,R,α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 9p1 + 8p2 ≥ 6, 11p1 + 8p3 ≥ 22/5,p2 + p3 ≥ 1/2
 .
Next, we will calculate the six marginal vectors. Let σ1 = (1, 2, 3). Then player σ(1)=1 receives
R({1}). Player 2 is the second player according to σ and because R({1}) ∼1 1/5R({1, 2}), his
marginal contribution to coalition {1} is (1 − 1/5)R({1, 2}) = 4/5R({1, 2}). From R({1}) ∼1
2/15R(N) and 4/5R({1, 2}) ∼2 3/5R(N) it follows that the marginal contribution of player 3 to
coalition {1, 2} equals (1−2/15−3/5)R(N) = 4/15R(N). ThusM σ1 = (2/15, 3/5, 4/15)R(N).
The other five marginal vectors are as follows.
σ2 = (1, 3, 2) Mσ2 = (2/15, 1/2, 11/30)R(N)
σ3 = (2, 1, 3) Mσ3 = (4/9, 1/4, 11/36)R(N)
σ4 = (2, 3, 1) Mσ4 = (1/2, 1/4, 1/4)R(N)
σ5 = (3, 1, 2) Mσ5 = (4/11, 129/220, 1/20)R(N)
σ6 = (3, 2, 1) Mσ6 = (1/2, 9/20, 1/20)R(N)
It is easy to check thatM σi belongs to the core for i = 3, 4, 5, 6. The other marginal vectors, Mσ1
and Mσ2 , only belong to the imputation set. The Shapley value φ, which is the average of the six
marginal vectors, equals φ = (1027/2970, 29/66, 29/135)R(N).
4 Three types of convexity
The following three statements about a deterministic TU game (N, v) are equivalent (cf. SHAPLEY
(1971) and ICHIISHI (1981)).
i. For all U ⊂ N and for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \U it holds that v(S ∪U)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪U)− v(T ).
ii. For all i ∈ N and for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \{i} it holds that v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≤ v(T ∪{i})−v(T ).
iii. All n! marginal vectorsmσ of (N, v) belong to the core C(v).
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A game (N, v) that satisfies these statements is called a convex game. Based on these statements we
define three types of convexity for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs.
Similar to SUIJS and BORM (1999), statement i can be interpreted as follows. The marginal
contributionof coalitionU to coalitionS, v(S∪U)−v(S), is smaller than the contribution ofU to T ,
v(T ∪ U)− v(T ). Thus, when allocations of v(S), v(T ) and v(S ∪ U) are proposed and if coalition
S is willing to let U join, that is, the members of S get from v(S ∪ U) at least as much as what they
get from v(S), then there exists an allocation of v(T ∪ U) that makes all players in T ∪ U better off.
The players in T get at least as much from v(T ∪ U) as from v(T ) and the players in U get at least
as much from v(T ∪ U) as from v(S ∪ U). If we take into account that players will only consider
individual rational allocations, then we can define a first kind of convexity as follows.
A cooperative game with stochastic payoffs is called coalitional-merge convex if and only if it is
superadditive and if for all U ⊂ N , U &= ∅, for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ U such that S &= ∅ and S &= T ,
for all pR(S) ∈ IR(S), for all qR(T ) ∈ IR(T ) and for all rR(S ∪ U) ∈ IR(S ∪ U) such that
riR(S ∪U) i piR(S) for all i ∈ S, there exists an allocation sR(T ∪U), s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪U), such that siR(T ∪ U) i qiR(T ) for all i ∈ T,siR(T ∪ U) i riR(S ∪ U) for all i ∈ U.
Notice that if we allow for S = ∅ in the second part of this definition and will define R(∅) = 0 and
IR(∅) = ∅, then that part implies superadditivity. Thus we can drop the first part of the definition. In
our opinion, the present definition allows for a better interpretation without ad hoc definitions for the
empty set. This is why we prefer this bipartite definition.
If we restrict ourselves to U = {i} for all i ∈ N then we arrive at a second type of convexity,
which is related to statement ii. For the same reason as above this definition is split into two parts. A
cooperative game with stochastic payoffs is called individual-mergeconvex if and only if the following
two conditions hold. In the first place, for all i ∈ N , for all T ⊂ N \ {i} such that T &= ∅ and for all
qR(T ) ∈ IR(T ) there exists an allocation sR(T ∪ {i}), s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪ {i}), such that sjR(T ∪ {i}) j qjR(T ) for all j ∈ T,siR(T ∪ {i}) i R({i}).
Secondly, for all i ∈ N , for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \{i} such that S &= ∅ and S &= T , for all pR(S) ∈ IR(S),
for all qR(T ) ∈ IR(T ) and for all rR(S ∪ {i}) ∈ IR(S ∪ {i}) such that rjR(S ∪ {i}) j pjR(S)
for all j ∈ S, there exists an allocation sR(T ∪ {i}), s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪ {i}), such that sjR(T ∪ {i}) j qjR(T ) for all j ∈ T,siR(T ∪ {i}) i riR(S ∪ {i}).
Finally, we call a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs marginal convex if and only if all its
marginal vectorsMσ belong to its core. This provides a sufficient condition for the Shapley value to
belong to the core when each player either has expectation- or quantile-preferences.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N,R,α) be a marginal convex game where all the functions f ik are linear. Then
the Shapley value belongs to the core C(N,R,α).
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Proof. According to theorem 3.5 the core C(N,R,α) is a convex set. Because all the marginal
vectors belong to the core, so does their average, the Shapley value.
When we consider other types of preferences then this result need not hold, as is shown in the
next example.
Example 4.2 Consider the game (N,R,α) withN = {1, 2, 3}, R({1}) = R({2}) = R({3}) = 0,
R({1, 2}) = R({1, 3}) = R({2, 3}) = 1 and R(N) ∼ U([2, 3]), that is, R(N) is uniformly
distributedover the interval [2,3]. The players 1 and 3 have expectation preferences and the preference
relation of player 2 is represented by the function
f2(t) =
 (t, t, t, t1/6/2) , t ≥ 0,(t, t, t, 2t/5) , t < 0.
The coordinates of f 2 correspond to the coalitions {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} and N , respectively. The
core of this game,
C(N,R,α) =
pR(N)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ p ∈ ∆
∗(N), p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥ 0, p3 ≥ 0, 5p1 + 128(p2)6 ≥ 2,
5p1 + 5p3 ≥ 2, 128(p2)6 + 5p3 ≥ 2
 ,
consists of two disjoint sets in∆∗(N). It contains all the marginal vectors and therefore this game is
marginal convex. Nevertheless, the Shapley valueφ = (19/60, 11/30, 19/60)R(N) is not an element
of the core since it belongs to both dom({1, 2}) and dom({2, 3}).
From the definitions it follows immediately that a coalitional-merge convex game is superadditive.
If there exists a coalition S &= ∅ such that IR(S) = ∅ then the game (N,R,α) is not superadditive by
lemma 3.3 and hence it is not coalitional-merge convex. The following theorem states a similar result
with respect to marginal convexity.
Theorem 4.3 If there exists a coalition S &= ∅ with IR(S) = ∅ then the game (N,R,α) is not
marginal convex.
Proof. Recall that
IR(S) = {pR(S) |p ∈ ∆∗(S), piR(S) i R({i}) for all i ∈ S } .
Let S &= ∅ be a coalition with IR(S) = ∅ such that IR(T ) &= ∅ for all subsets T of S. Note that S
should contain at least two players since IR({i}) = {R({i})} &= ∅ for all i ∈ N . Without loss of
generality assume that S = {1, 2, . . . , s}. Let σ be a permutation of N such that σ(i) = i. We have
seen before that the marginal vectorMσ is defined by
Mσσ(j) = ασ(j)(Y
σ
σ(j), R(N))R(N)
for all j ∈ N where
Y σσ(j) =
1− j−1∑
k=1
ασ(k)(Y
σ
σ(k), R(S
σ
σ(j)))
R(Sσσ(j)).
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coalitional-merge convex
⇓
individual-merge convex
⇓
marginal convex
Figure 4.1: Relations between the three types of convexity.
If Y σj ≺j R({j}) for some j < s thenMσj ≺j R({j}) becauseMσj ∼j Y σj . ThusMσ /∈ I(N,R,α).
Otherwise, if Rσj j R({j}) for all j < s then IR(S) = ∅ implies that Y σs ≺s R({s}). From
Mσs ∼s Y
σ
s we obtain, once again, thatMσ /∈ I(N,R,α). Consequently,Mσ /∈ C(N,R,α) since
I(N,R,α)⊃ C(N,R,α). We conclude that this game is not marginal convex.
Our definitions of convexity are not equivalent for cooperative gameswith stochastic payoffs,while
the corresponding notions are equivalent for deterministic TU games. Figure 4.1 shows the relations
between the three definitions. The latter relation, individual-mergeconvex games aremarginal convex,
is shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4 Let (N,R,α) be a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs. If it is individual-merge
convex then it is marginal convex.
Proof. Let (N,R,α) be an individual-merge convex game and take a permutationσ ∈ Π(N). Without
loss of generality assume that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, let Zσ,k be an efficient allocation
of R({1, . . . , k}) defined by Zσ,ki = αi(Y σi , R({1, . . . , k}))R({1, . . . , k}) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and
k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Notice that Zσ,n = Mσ . We show that Zσ,k is a core-element of the subgame Γk
with player set {1, 2, . . . , k} by induction on k.
If k = 1 then it is clear that Zσ,1 ∈ C(Γ1). Next, assume that Zσ,k ∈ C(Γk) for k =
1, 2, . . . , m − 1 where m ≤ n. We have to prove that Zσ,m ∈ C(Γm). Consider a coalition
S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , m − 1}. Then it follows from Zσ,m−1 ∈ C(Γm−1) and Zσ,mj ∼j Zσ,m−1j for all
j ∈ Sσm−1 that {Zσ,mj }j∈S /∈ dom(S). Therefore, coalition S has no incentives to leave the coalition
{1, 2, . . . , m}.
Next, we show that also the coalition S ∪ {m} has no incentive to leave the coalition {1, . . . , m}
if Zσ,m is allocated. Let pR(S) ∈ IR(S) be such that∑j∈S αj(pjR(S), R(S∪ {m})) is minimized.
Define rj = αj(pjR(S), R(S ∪ {m})) then rjR(S ∪ {m}) ∼j pjR(S) for all j ∈ S and rm :=
1 −
∑
j∈S rj is as large as possible. So, due to monotonicity of the preferences, rmR(S ∪ {m}) is
the best payoff player m can expect when cooperating with coalition S. Let T = {1, . . . , m − 1}
and i = m, then T ∪ {i} = {1, . . . , m}. Because Zσ,m−1 ∈ C(Γm−1) ⊂ I(Γm−1) and I(Γm−1) =
IR({1, . . . , m − 1}) it holds that Zσ,m−1 ∈ IR(T ). Since the game (N,R,α) is individual-merge
convex there exists an allocation sR({1, . . . , m}), s ∈ ∆∗({1, . . . , m}), such that sjR({1, . . . , m}) j Z
σ,m−1
j for j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 1},
smR({1, . . . , m}) m rmR(S ∪ {m})
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From sjR({1, . . . , m}) j Zσ,m−1j ∼j Zσ,mj = αj(Y σj , R({1, . . . , m}))R({1, . . . , m}) and theo-
rem 2.2 we derive sj ≥ αj(Y σj , R({1, . . . , m})) for j = 1, . . . , m− 1. Thus
sm = 1−
∑
j∈S
sj
≤ 1−
∑
j∈S
αj(Y
σ
j , R({1, . . . , m})) = αm(Y
σ
m, R({1, . . . , m})),
where the last equality holds because Zσ,m is an efficient allocation ofR({1, . . . , m}). So, Zσ,mm m
smR({1, . . . , m}). Together with smR({1, . . . , m}) m rmR(S ∪ {m}) and transitivity we obtain
Zσ,mm m rmR(S ∪ {m}). But we stated before that rmR(S ∪ {m}) is the best payoff playerm can
obtain when cooperating with coalition S. Therefore there exists no individual rational allocation for
coalition S ∪ {m} that yields playerm a strictly better payoff then Z σ,mm . Hence, coalition S ∪ {m}
has no incentive to part company with coalition S σm if Zσ,m is allocated. Consequently, we have that
Zσ,m ∈ C(Γm). Takingm = n then gives thatM σ = Zσ,n ∈ C(Γn) = C(N,R,α).
For deterministic convex games it is well known that each of its subgames has a nonempty core.
We can derive a similar result for games with stochastic payoffs.
Theorem 4.5 Let (N,R,α) be a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs. If it is individual-merge
convex then all of its subgames have a nonempty core.
Proof. When the game (N,R,α) is individual-merge convex then each subgame (S, R,α), S &= ∅,
is also individual-merge convex. According to theorem 4.4 each subgame is marginal convex. We
conclude that all subgames have a nonempty core.
For two-person games it holds that all three types of convexity are equivalent. In particular it
holds that marginal convex games are individual-merge convex. The following example shows that
this need not hold for games with three or more players. Because coalitional-merge convex games are
by definition individual-merge convex, it follows immediately from the next example that a marginal
convex game also need not be coalitional-merge convex.
Example 4.6 Consider the following game (N,R,α) where N = {1, 2, 3}, R({i}) = 0 for all
i ∈ N , R({1, 2}) = 3, R({1, 3}) = 2, R({2, 3}) = 6 and R(N) ∼ U([5, 15]). All players have
quantile-preferences with β1 = 0.1, β2 = 0.5 and β3 = 0.9. In particular it holds for qi &= 0 and
pi ∈ IR for all i ∈ N that
αi(piR(S), qiR(T )) = piu
R(S)
βi
/(qiu
R(T )
βi
),
p1u
R(N)
β1
= 6p1, p2u
R(N)
β2
= 10p2 and p3uR(N)β3 = 14p3.
The set of imputations is
I(N,R,α) = {pR(N)| p1+ p2 + p3 = 1, pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N}.
and the core equals
C(N,R,α) = {pR(N) ∈ I(N,R,α)| 6p1+ 10p2 ≥ 3, 6p1 + 14p3 ≥ 2, 10p2 + 14p3 ≥ 6}.
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Take permutation σ1 = (1, 2, 3). Then player 1 receivesR({1}) = 0. Next, player 2 gets his marginal
contribution to coalition {1}, which is
(1− α1(R({1}), R({1, 2})))R({1, 2}) = (1− 0)R({1, 2}) = R({1, 2}) = 3.
Player 3 receives all that is left of R(N):
(1− α1(R({1}), R(N))− α2(R({1, 2}), R(N)))R(N)
= (1− 0− 3/10)R(N) = 7/10R(N).
So,Mσ1 = (0, 3/10, 7/10)R(N). In the same way all the other marginal vectors can be calculated
and it is easy to check that they all belong to the core.
However, this game is neither individual-merge nor coalitional-merge convex. Let U = {1},
S = {2} and T = {2, 3}. Then S ∪U = {1, 2} and T ∪U = N . Furthermore, let pR(S) = R({2}),
qR(T ) = (1, 0)R({2, 3}) and rR(S ∪ U) = (1, 0)R({1, 2}). Then pR(S) ∈ IR(S), because
R({2}) 2 R({2}), qR(T ) ∈ IR(T ), because R({2, 3}) 2 R({2}) and 0 3 R({3}), and
rR(S ∪ U) ∈ IR(S ∪ U) satisfies 0 2 pR(S). If there exists an allocation sR(T ∪ U) = sR(N),
s ∈ ∆∗(N), such that
s1R(N) 1 r1R(S ∪ U) = R({1, 2})
s2R(N) 2 q2R(T ) = R({2, 3})
s3R(N) 3 q3R(T ) = 0
then this is equivalent to
6s1 ≥ 3
10s2 ≥ 6
14s3 ≥ 0
⇔

s1 ≥ 1/2
s2 ≥ 3/5
s3 ≥ 0
But this implies that s1 + s2 + s3 ≥ 1/2+ 3/5+ 0 > 1, which is in contradiction to s ∈ ∆∗(N).
By definition it holds that coalitional-merge convex games are individual-merge convex. One can
easily see that the reverse relationwill hold if the game has two players. The following theorem shows
the same result for games with three players.
Theorem 4.7 Let (N,R,α) be a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs and with three players. If
the game is individual-merge convex, then it is coalitional-merge convex.
Proof. Let (N,R,α) be a three-person game that is individual-merge convex. Firstly, we have to
show that the game is superadditive. For this, let S and T be two nonempty coalitions in N such
that S ∩ T = ∅. Because there are only three players, we know that either S or T consists of one
player. Assume without loss of generality that S = {i} for some i ∈ N . Let pR(S) ∈ IR(S), so,
pR(S) = R({i}). Because the game is individual-merge convex, it follows from theorems 4.3 and 4.4
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that IR(T ) &= ∅. Let qR(T ) ∈ IR(T ). Then there exists an allocation sR(T ∪{i}), s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪{i}),
such that siR(T ∪ {i}) i R({i})sjR(T ∪ {i}) j qjR({T}) for all j ∈ T.
Hence, the game is superadditive.
Secondly, we have to show that the remaining conditionof coalitional-merge convexity is satisfied.
Let U ⊂ N . If |U | = 1 then this condition is equivalent to the second condition of individual-merge
convexity with U = {i} and thus it is satisfied. Next, if U = {i, j} ⊂ N = {i, j, k} then there exist
no coalitions S and T such that S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ U , S &= ∅ and S &= T hold and consequently, there
is nothing to check. If U = N then there is also nothing to check. We conclude that the second
condition of coalitional-merge convexity is satisfied.
In case of four or more players, we were neither able to prove that individual-merge convex games
are coalitional-merge convex nor could we find a counterexample. Hence, at this moment this remains
open.
Finally, we return to the example of a bankruptcy game in the previous section and we check if it
satisfies any of the convexity concepts introduced in this section. It is well-known that deterministic
bankruptcy games are convex.
Example 4.8 Consider the same bankruptcy situation as in example 3.7. There we noticed thatM σ1
andMσ2 do not belong to the core. Hence this game is not marginal convex and consequently it is
neither individual- nor coalitional-merge convex. However, when we change the preferences of the
agents such that all players have expectation-preferences then the corresponding bankruptcy game
satisfies all the convexity concepts.
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